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                     Abstract  
This senior project aims to challenge the traditional thinking of public health. My inspiration 
from this topic simply comes from my interest in bettering global health for all people. With an 
ever shifting political and social environment, this paper strives to seek the most successful 
strategies in combating infectious diseases. By using three prominent and global infectious 
diseases, Ebola, Zika and Influenza, this paper analyzes the failures and successes of 
international support and response teams. This paper also uses the Global Health Security 
Agenda (GHSA) as a foundation to analyze and support the claim that successful global health 
interventions are not successful by framing diseases as if they are security threats.  
Building from existing literature, this paper strives to answer the question, "Could the Global 
Health Security Agenda Protect Americans from Emerging Diseases?" The relationship between 
health and security is an ever complex and complicated topic, which involves all sectors of 
American policy. In order to further support this topic, and strive to seek better solutions for 
effective infectious disease response, there are key recommendations for the future of public 
health.  
In all cases, it was found that the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) and securitizing the 
complicated issues of public health are expected to not be successful looking towards the future 
of public health. In order to fully support and positively affect the future of public health, 
governments should promote strong domestic health care systems, anti-corrupt administrations, 
women's empowerment and literacy, local health initiatives and treat every disease intervention 
uniquely. International health workers and governments should also be aware and carefully face 
the obstacles of cultural differences, widespread fear, and the historical, political environments.  
By the end of this project, I hope the reader finds a strong and convincing argument explaining 
why the Global Health Security Agenda will not protect Americans, or help combat global 
emerging infectious diseases. While this project only skims the top of the debate of intertwining 
of health and security, it does provide a basic understanding for those looking to understand the 
complicated questions and answers of global health.  
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Introduction 
Since 2014, an initiative named the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) has targeted 
infectious disease prevention through a series of capacity building projects. So far, around the 
world, people are still affected by communicable diseases, and those who suffer the most are 
often women, children, and impoverished communities. Three infectious diseases, Ebola, Zika 
and Influenza, have received ample attention and have affected large amounts of people in the 
last ten years. It is because of this, and a shift in American security theory, that the United States 
treats health conflicts as a security threat. This is extremely problematic. This paper provides a 
historical timeline about health and security, and also gives the reader insight on the future of 
infectious diseases. One by one, each chapter will go through the history of how these diseases 
are prevented and treated, using the Global Health Security Agenda as a foundation, and then it 
will conclude with a summary of findings and analyzes. This research paper will use the three 
infectious diseases, Ebola, Zika, and Influenza as supporting evidence to claim why the Global 
Health Security Agenda will not protect Americans from communicable diseases, or prevent 
future epidemics in developing nations. But first, analyzing the past fifty or so years is necessary 
to understand the current health environment. 
To understand the future of public health prevention, it is extremely necessary to 
comprehend the past failures and successes of how Americans handled health. For more than 
thirty years, from the mid 1940s onwards, medical science was extremely successful. Together 
doctors, scientists and health workers, in combination with clinical science, drug discovery, and 
technology inventions, conquered diseases both infectious and noncommunicable. But as time 
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went on, with any golden age, America realized that eventually the world would again be disease 
ridden. 
The practice of modern medicine began long before the 1800s, however in the 1830s, the 
use of modern medicine was documented when a group of physicians came to realize that their 
techniques, like leaching and bleeding, to slow, treat and cure diseases were actually not very 
effective for individual or communal health (Le Fanu, 1999, p. 4). From then on, doctors focused 
on diagnosing specific illnesses, so that they could recommend and prescribe the correct, 
individual treatments. Using blood and urine samples, along with the rise of individualized 
diagnoses, doctors grew to be extremely talented at categorizing each illness. Overtime the 
progression of disease changed very little. Infectious diseases, normally affected the young, and 
the old suffered from chronic diseases which were not yet discovered how to cure. But besides a 
few ailing conditions, America's overall health seemed to be improving annually. Infant mortality 
decreased, lifespan increased and infectious diseases were not necessarily their major cause for 
concern (Le Fanu, 1999, p. 4) 
Humanity’s use of science has proved itself over and over to be a source of limitless 
mobilization and a fundamental aspect of economic prosperity. The age of optimism, which gave 
name to a long span of medical advancements, began around the time of the Manhattan Project, 
and in the years following, Watson would discover the structure of DNA, uncovering the mystery 
of genetics and Yuri Gagarin’s successful orbit around the moon would launch the Space Race 
(Le Fanu, 1999, p.189). One after another, these historical scientific events continued for the next 
few decades, paving the path for more successful medical advancements.  
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The discoveries of medicines like penicillin and cortisone, technologies like the pump, 
and treatments like open heart surgery were forged by the necessities of war time. After the 
rediscovery of penicillin in 1941 by Howard Florey, allied soldiers as early as D-Day in 1944 
were treated with the medicine, presumably influencing the outcome of the war. (Nurse Groups, 
2005) Other scientists like Phillip Hench’s, who discovered that bullets could be removed from a 
soldier, without killing the patient, encouraged other surgeons to perform difficult operations        
(Nurse Groups, 2005). Therapeutic discoveries changed the daily practice of modern medicine, 
but more importantly it was supposed to rid the world of diseases. Although these treatments 
were life changing for a lot of the world, they would eventually contributed to the ignorance for  
how important it is to promote a robust public health system, rather than just concentrating on 
specific disease target interventions or relying on pills and technology inventions. It is virtually 
impossible for an entire scale of diseases to be silenced through one invention. 
Around the time penicillin was discovered, America thought they beat the fight against 
diseases. Penicillin, which was thought to be the most important medical discovery, curing not 
only infections like pneumonia, but also chronic diseases like arthritis. The use of penicillin 
allowed doctors to shift their attention to chronic illness, and away from infectious diseases. 
America was so confident in the future of infectious diseases, that government officials, 
scientists and doctors publicly promised that, “[i]t [was] time to close the books on infectious 
diseases, declare the war against pestilence won, and shift national resources to such chronic 
problems such as cancer and heart disease,” (Specter, 2014). Steering away from infectious 
diseases, defunding projects, and increasing individualized diagnoses made health workers and 
systems turn away from promoting basic healthcare. With the idea that antibiotics and medicine 
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could cure infections with a pill, attention completely shifted, and America almost totally forgot 
about the importance of health for each individual. Although noncommunicable diseases should 
still be considered a global issue, the attention lost on infections created a snowball effect in the 
decline of modern public health systems. The age of optimism tricked scientists, doctors, and 
governments in believing that all diseases could be cured by only pills, vaccines, and disease 
specific interventions. The world would eventually come to realize that a robust public health 
system, trust between the people and government, gender equality, basic sanitation, and 
education are just some of the basics that prove to protect nations against disease. 
 But, after the discovery of antibiotics and war medicines in the 1940s, nearly all doctors, 
scientists and federal health workers believed that curative medicines would erase the need of 
prevention. In the 1950s and 60s, the international community was extremely confident in its 
ability to suppress any emerging diseases and curative medicines were so successful during this 
period, that clinicians “…shrugged off bacterial diseases… such as Staphylococcus and 
tuberculosis… and had.. deftly moved [these diseases] from the ‘extremely dangerous’ column to 
that of ‘easily managed minor infections.’ Even the world’s leading institutions, like the World 
Health Organization, (WHO), were so confident in organochlorines, chemicals that killed 
mosquitos, that it even declared malaria a minor global health issue" (Garrett, 1994, p. 31).  
It took years and an enormous amount of money for the health community to realize that 
these advancements would not work as long term solutions. Scientists started to realize that 
drugs like penicillin and technological advances, would not be able to rid the world of killer 
diseases, and that people would again die of curable diseases. But as will be explained, believing 
that the solution is only in medicines and scientific advancements is problematic. The transition 
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from America’s age of optimism to the introduction of emerging diseases created a vast global 
fear of diseases, which still remains today.  
Although the age of optimism contributed to many successful post war treatments, it 
really wasn’t treating the diseases that contributed to the highest mortalities. And this is still true 
today. A lot of the high profile diseases are often not the most deadly, but rather more people die 
of preventable diseases in developing nations.  
During the age of optimism, the amount of newly developed drugs was running about 
seventy new discoveries a year, until about 1971, when it began to decrease (Le Fanu, 1999, p.
246). During the beginning, health workers and doctors believed that these inventions, like 
penicillin and vaccines, would be the long term solution to eradicate disease from both rich and 
poor countries. But soon, they would run into more obstacles. These realizations were important 
for scientists to understand what contributed to the end of the age of optimism.    
This entire era reveals how important it is to create a holistic, and stable public health 
system. Not long after the end of the age of optimism, the pharmaceutical companies that were 
hailed as heroes began to run into trouble. The thalidomide incident, which stunted the 
pharmaceutical companies progress towards mass production appeared after pregnant women, 
who took sleeping medications, gave birth to children without limbs (Fintel, Samaras, & Carias, 
2009). This story was a symbol of how the pharmaceutical’s massive production of drugs, was 
not regulated as well as it should have been, and thus was not a long term solution for disease 
prevention and treatment. In the years following, drugs would have to be tested on animals for 
toxicity, but not only would this process become longer, but also more expensive. This means 
that doctors wouldn't be able to rely on invented pills, or vaccines to eradicate diseases as 
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quickly as they hoped. Eventually, pharmaceutical companies grew tired of the failures to find 
cures for diseases like cancer, so they had to turn to lifestyle disease medications in hopes to 
make more money. A lot of pharmaceutical companies blamed strict regulations and the low 
investments of research and drug innovation on the little amount of new discoveries. 
 Throughout the 1980s, medical technologies were important for diagnosing patients. 
While numbers of diagnosing technologies were used in the daily life of a doctor, it seemed like 
the traditional practices of medicine had declined. The increase of technologies had similar 
consequences that the mass drug production had. With all of these new technologies, doctors in 
all different fields believed that there was a technical answer to every disease, and their daily 
practices relied heavily on drugs and inventions. Which in turn, completely shifted their attention 
towards more prevailing diseases.  
 The short lived age of optimism symbolized a point in scientific history where faults can 
be learned from. It is not to say that there were not any more innovations made after the 1970s.  
Minimal invasive surgeries would be improved, and well as improvements for breast and colon 
cancer survival rates (Le Fanu, 1999, p.266). But without improved medical practices, and 
support for basic health systems, along with the political and social obstacles that stand in the 
way, there would be more diseases to come. As time progressed, so did diseases, and suddenly 
America fell susceptible to diseases that penicillin was supposed to cure, like sexually 
transmitted diseases (STDs). 
Thanks to the invention of antibiotics treatments for venereal diseases, it seemed like 
there were zero emerging infections that could scare America. Before the availability of 
antibiotics, over 13,000 Americans died annually of syphilis, but immediately after, there were 
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less than 6,000 deaths each year (Garrett, 1994, p.  264). Most Americans and Westerners were 
healthy. Non communicable diseases, car accidents, suicides and old age accounted for almost 
100% of all deaths (Garrett, 1994, p. 264). It seemed like the right decision to decrease budgets 
and education in sexually transmitted diseases prevention, since medications took care of 
treatment, even without doctor's help. America had its back towards an issue that was 
approaching quickly. One by one, other STDs, like genital warts, herpes, pelvic inflammatory 
diseases and chlamydia alarmed health officials of the dangers of STDs, specifically in 
developing nations. Even with the discovery of therapeutic medicines, America would fall 
susceptible to these diseases. 
During the same time, when infectious diseases were again emerging in the United States, 
they were also rising at a concerning rate in the developing world, specifically Africa. Recently 
plagued with colonialism, slavery, and war, African countries were now corrupt, in debt, 
suffering with some of the worst infectious diseases, and yet spending money on domestic 
military operations and warfare. For example, the war between Tanzania and Uganda in 1978,  
lasting only a short five month, managed to ruin both of the economies and catalyze a complete 
shutdown of health infrastructures, and habit some of the worst vector borne illnesses (Garrett, 
1994, p.210). With booming populations and high debt accumulation, the government's looked 
for ways to incorporate their economies in the global market. Countries with natural resource 
abundance sold to the West. While there was foreign aid to attempt to build African economies, it 
had no effect on the health of the countries. Disease prevention might as well have been the last 
priority in countries recently emerging from colonialism. 
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Large projects to build up the economy, and to protect the governments seemed like the 
best idea to attempt at engaging in the global market. But, these large scale projects that built 
dams, airports and container shipping ports had nothing to do with improving health of  
individuals (Garrett, 1994, p. 199). In the 60s and 70s, along with infrastructure and military 
projects, governments were focused towards the production of agriculture for exportation, hence 
most of the money was not towards healthcare (Garrett, 1994, p. 200). Most foreign attention 
was focused on food production and availability, especially as countries fell to famine. With the 
idea that modernization was the key to all Africa’s issues, post WWII actors worked to “[pave] 
towards free market capitalist industrialism… to raise the standards of life and health of a 
nation’s people”(Garrett, 1994, p. 200). Thus, most of investments in Africa were devoted to 
mining, manufacturing and petroleum. But this would further work to undermine the importance 
of a strong public health system, especially from a nation coming out of political instability. 
Along with the downward spiral of developing nations and the increase of infectious 
diseases, several historians and intellectuals had dove into the question of rising infectious 
diseases. They soon began to realize that eliminating disease was also political and social, and 
does not just come from developing new medicines. But even that realization didn't seem to stick 
for America.  
To make matters worse, the first bioterrorism event occurred in America in 1981. In the 
small town of Dalles, a religious cult called the Rajneeshees poisoned with salmonella, and 
although it wasn't deadly, it still reminded how vulnerable America is to both natural and 
unnatural diseases (Miller, 2001, p. 19). Overall, over a thousand people had reported symptoms, 
and 751 people were confirmed to have salmonella (Miller, 2001, p. 19). The cult’s medical 
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officer, Ma Anand Puja, also nicknamed Nurse Mengele, used salmonella strains, obtained from 
the germ bank, to incapacitate voters in the county. Officials later found out that Puja not only 
tempered with salmonella, but she repeatedly tried to culture the AIDS virus to use as her next 
weapon (Miller, 2001, p. 19). 
 Long before the salmonella incident, America and the Soviet Union were already experts 
at transforming germs into weapons. Even before modern warfare, warriors used to infect their 
arrowheads with manure and dead corpses, throw dead bodies over city walls, and give blankets 
infected with smallpox to native Americans (Miller, 2001, p.45 )  
At this time, America not only had to worry about natural diseases, but unnatural diseases 
that could potentially harm America. The Soviet Union and America had long standing battle to 
see who could develop biological warfare better and faster than the other. But it wasn’t just the 
Soviets that America worried about. Other nations had jumped on the bandwagon and started 
producing biological weapons. In order to be extremely prepared, America tested experiments on 
proxy cities to determine how to spread anthrax through Soviet cities. By this, America 
developed weapons that could induce encephalitis, yellow fever, and over fifty other viruses 
(Miller, 2001, p.  46).  
The concern of bioterror threats mostly came from a heightened fear and precaution,  
"[i]n the early to mid 1990s,... following the break-up of the Soviet Union when political and 
economic instability in the region, accompanied by growing lawlessness and the rise of 
organized criminal groups, raised fears that materials were being sold to terrorist organizations 
and ‘rogue states’ such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Cuba, and North Korea" (Mcinnes & Kelly, 
2012).  Before the Rajaneesh incident, there really hadn’t been any large scale modern germ 
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warfare against America. But domestically, the United States had a lot more to worry about then 
the possibility of a germs. 
 Back home, the age of optimism was over, and infectious diseases were proving more 
resistant than originally was thought. The diseases they thought could be cured were becoming 
antibiotic resistant, and now America worried about a potential bioterrorism attack. But, instead 
of educating and incentivizing doctors and scientists to work on infectious diseases prevention, “ 
… the Epidemic Intelligence Service, … trained thousands of diseases detectives, [while] the 
[other] billions of federal dollars were being spent on biology tended to go into research aimed at 
cancer and the illness of old age, such as heart disease” (Alcabes, 2009, p. 90).  
 The American government concentrated on immunizing the nation as permanent 
protection for international disease threats. President Bush also announced they would be 
immunizing everyone for smallpox, even though the last outbreak was in 1949 (Alcabes, 2009, p.
119). From that, George Bush adopted the BioSHield Project, “which was responsible for the 
smallpox vaccination, but also allocated 10 billion dollars to bioterrorism prevention and 
biosecurity during the early 2000s” (Alcabes, 2009, p.184).  Preparing for a bioterror attack came 
from agents of fear. Some argue that it is essentially worthless and too expensive to prepare for 
events that might not even happen, saying that, “there’s nothing to be gained by trying to prepare 
for the unlikely and unforeseeable” (Alcabes, 2009, p.186). During the time, the government was 
emerging from the war on terrorism, so covering all their grounds and preparing for something 
that might happen was better than not preparing at all. The problem was that there were plenty of 
already emerged diseases that needed to be treated, domestically and internationally, but were not 
being addressed.  
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Media played a significant part of this issue. Since the war on terror was so politicized 
and widely known, part of stopping diseases came from trying to control public fear. But it 
becomes difficult asking health officials to predict what next disease will plague America. And in 
the off case that a bioterror weapon was used on a large scale in the United States, those health 
officials would be blamed if nothing was done to be prepared. Part of their job is to, …”lessen 
anxiety. But [they] will not have done anything to make us safer” (Alcabes, 2009, p. 187). But 
you can’t blame them… how is it possible to fix a problem even before it occurs? But then again, 
in a society plagued by fear, nobody could tell a health official it was useless to not prepare for a 
biological war.  
The bioterror era contributed to a society concentrated on specific cause and effect 
correlations, and “almost always we presume that a epidemic resulted because of the 
mismanagement of small risks” (Alcabes, 2009, p. 220). And while Bioterrorism was sucking up 
all the funds for health promotion, real epidemics, like MRSA, did not carry enough popularity 
to receive ample attention or money (Alcabes, 2009, p.226).  
 The twenty first century proved to be very hard to elevate and mobilize global public 
health. The wealth gap increased enormously, making it even more difficult for developing 
nations and impoverished Americans to have access to affordable medication and treatment. 
Amartya Sen, an economist and public health expert showed the correlation between, "the wealth 
of nations, and the degree of fairness with which that wealth was distributed within nations 
determined country's infant mortality rates"(Garrett, 2000, p. 548). But it wasn't even just in 
developing nations where infectious and noncommunicable diseases soared. At the same time, 
the private sector of pharmaceutical companies saw no incentive or profit in producing drugs for 
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diseases which largely affected the poor.  Just like pharmaceutical companies, governments 
found health systems of lesser importance in a world of competitive economic prosperity. But, 
with the twenty first century challenges, public health had to be a national priority because it was 
hanging on by a string.  
Public health is not a one way street. It requires an ample amount of collaboration, 
assistance and trust between nations, governments, health workers and citizens. People rely on 
the government to protect them against epidemics, pandemics or even just small outbreaks. And 
in return, the citizens are supposed to trust the guidelines of the public health governance. But, 
with all of these necessary pieces to the puzzle, public health in the twenty first century was 
losing the battle. 
Slowing over time, health became an individual responsibility. Even with the amazing 
discoveries of technology and antibiotics, "we're still just as vulnerable to pathogens as we were 
decades ago" (Garrett, 2000, p. 573). Because health governments are not concentrating on 
creating strong and supportive health systems, preventable diseases are killing people 
everywhere. Even in America, there rate of maternal mortality is extremely high. The history of 
political corruption, accountability and war has affected the unspoken "bond" between the 
government and its citizens a great deal. When one party has broken the contract, the entire 
system can fail. 
The future of public health is extremely dependent on a responsible and transparent 
healthcare system. While the last century has made significant progress to improve global health, 
these advances are constantly being tested by war, political corruption, and government. The 
conversation not only relies on how the global health system can progress, but also issues like 
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extreme poverty, political corruption, race issues, could progress. The point is that global health 
is not caused by one single factor. It is not just because of globalization, migration or poverty. 
Thus collaboration between governments, citizens, and health organizations need to work 
together and create a health system that is for every individual. 
In  the twenty first century, many governments have separated themselves from the health 
systems. Public health, "...will either rise or fall, ...with the ultimate course of globalization. If 
the passage of time finds ever widening wealth gaps, disappearing middle classes, international 
financial lawlessness, and still rising individualism, the essential elements of public health will 
be imperiled… perhaps all over the world"(Garrett, 2000, p. 582). Theses issues will eventually 
have to be brought up in order to fully see a disease free world. But what is being done today, to 
prevent any emerging diseases? 
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Introduction Part Two: Global Health Security Agenda  
Infectious diseases can have the ability to spread very quickly. Since the 1970s, "over 
forty new infectious diseases were discovered" including Ebola, SARS, Middle Eastern 
Respiratory Syndrome, H7N9, and so many more (Baylor College of Medicine, 2018). 
Thousands of people around the world are affected, permanently impacted, or killed by 
infectious diseases every year, and countries without the ability to stop the next epidemic are a 
huge threat to the rest of the world. Increased travel, trade, globalization, etc, give infectious 
diseases the ability use humans, and animals, as vectors, spreading faster than they ever before. 
Most of the world is still extremely unprepared for another pandemic to explode. So, with this in 
mind, the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) was born.  
Since February 2014, when the Center for Disease Control (CDC) commenced the Global 
Health Security Agenda (GHSA) to prevent, protect and respond to global, infectious health 
threats, over thirty countries, international and non-governmental partners have signed the 
agenda in hopes to respond and promote biosecurity as a main strategy to stop the spread of 
infectious diseases. Ultimately, and with success, the GHSA should provide every country with 
the capacity to, ”[p]revent and reduce the likelihood of outbreaks – natural, accidental, or 
intentional; [d]etect threats early to save lives; [and] [r]espond rapidly and effectively using 
multi-sectoral, international coordination and communication" (CDC, 2016). Attempting to 
address international health vulnerabilities, the Global Health Security Agenda follows in the 
footsteps of some of the largest governmental health programs, such as the President’s 
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Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003 and the President’s Malaria Initiative in 
2005, which were both initiated as governmental programs to address epidemics and allocate 
over eight billion dollars (Gostin & Phelan, 2014). However, only the Global Health Security 
Agenda, is not concentrated on one specific disease, but instead securing America from the threat 
of other countries unprepared health systems.  
The launch of the GHSA took place under the Obama administration just before some of 
the first media covered cases of Ebola in West Africa (Schrinning, 2017). Since then, the United 
States has aided $1 billion to seventeen high risk countries in order to build the capacity of each 
nation so they are able to respond to their own emerging diseases without the threat of them 
coming into America (Schrinning, 2017). This past year, in 2017, Rex Tillerson has supported the 
GHSA, announcing that he plans to extend the program into 2024 (Schrinning, 2017). He said, 
"it [GHSA] is one of the most useful frameworks for halting the spread of infectious diseases. He 
[announced] $1 billion in investments to strengthen global health security in at-risk 
countries…" (Schrinning, 2017).  
  The premise of this effort is to evaluate, then fill, any gaps in domestic public health 
systems. After their evaluation, the GHSA steering group allocates a grade depending on how 
well their system could handle an emergency disease outbreak, and then works to address the 
areas where epidemics could spread. While this project is designed to address any sort of 
problem areas in health systems, it also allows the United States to evaluate which nations are 
the biggest threat to global health. 
  The logistical way GHSA works is broken up into two phases. Phase I is designed to find 
gaps and weaknesses in countries public health capabilities, by completing a self assessment test, 
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where the country rates its own program based on how confident and secure they feel to respond 
to health threats. This assessment is called the Joint External Evaluation (JEE), which is used by 
all countries involved with GHSA (Global Health Security Agenda, 2018). After recognizing the 
gaps and taking the JEE test, the country moves on to Phase II. This part is designed to 
physically address and fix the gaps which the respective countries have found. This is different 
depending on the country, and could include providing necessary equipment, training health 
workers, rebuilding an entire new set of public health programs, or creating a surveillance team, 
which are used to detect any newly emerging diseases (Global Health Security Agenda, 2018). 
Overall, both phase I and II are designed to address specific goals for each nation in hopes to 
combat health threats, and mitigate the threat of infectious diseases for Americans.  
The initiative is governed by the Steering Group, which includes, Canada, Chile, Finland, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Kenya, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Korea, and the 
United States (Global Health Security Agenda, 2018). These countries are responsible for 
donating money and providing insight into investing in developing new technology, transporting 
necessary medical supplies for infectious disease response, rebuilding health systems in West 
Africa, studying antimicrobial resistance, and combatting bioterrorism threats (Global Health 
Security Agenda, 2018). The United States is the largest donor, amounting to donating over one 
billion dollars to seventeen “at-risk” nations (Schrinning, 2017). Most of these nations are 
located in Sub-Saharan Africa, however this is designed to be a global project, and not just 
focused on African nations. While each leader in the Steering Group is given a specific duty, 
there is a lot of collaboration. Korea has pledged to contribute $100M to 13 countries over the 
next 5 years, and Canada has donated $20M in 2016 to assist 15 nations (Schrinning, 2017). 
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Other countries, like Spain and Italy are working to train “at risk” nations by strengthening South 
East Asian labs and training workers. The World Bank has approved $110 million to the 
Regional Surveillance Enhancement Project to strengthen African health surveillance. Finland, 
Germany, Saudi Arabia and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) have pledged to 
support the Joint External Evaluation (Global Health Security Agenda, 2018.). The GHSA's 
collaboration is enormous, and although it was started and led as an American project, it is 
expanding each year.  
Since the initiative started, there has been a lot of capacity building progress made in 
African countries. For example, in Uganda, “[t]he  DoD and CDC has created a secure lab for 
dangerous pathogens ... including providing a secure perimeter fence, guard station, x-ray, and 
metal detector, and facility lighting; secure window and doors; surveillance cameras; and 
extensive biosafety and biosecurity training, including training on dual-use research of 
concern” (Global Health Security Agenda, 2018. P, 11). Other countries such as, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo have made significant progress since an, “unprecedented yellow fever 
outbreak in DR Congo in 2016 (with 17 deaths as of September 18), the United States provided 
surge support to help plan and conduct large-scale vaccination campaigns and to complete 
laboratory testing….In total, more than 9 million at- risk persons were vaccinated” ( Global 
Health Security Agenda, 2018, p, 12). The GHSA has provided capacity building projects to 
places, such as,  “Uganda [which] now has a secure lab for studying dangerous germs. Tanzania 
has a digital communications network so people can phone in information on potential outbreaks 
from remote locations. Liberia has more than 115 frontline disease detectives trained by the 
CDC. Cameroon shortened its response time to recent outbreaks of cholera and bird flu from 8 
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weeks to just 24 hours. The DRC controlled an outbreak of yellow fever and built an emergency 
operations center (EOC)—a kind of war room for responding to outbreaks” (Yong, 2018). The 
capacity building projects are growing, and it seems like America’s strategy to create health 
security involves many of the countries that would normally give rise to some of the worst 
infectious diseases in the world.  
 Since the beginning, the Global Health Security Agenda has received strong bipartisan 
support. Former president Barack Obama supported the project immensely, and since then it still 
has received large governmental support. Even though it was originally a five year project 
project, the White House Senior Director of Health Security, Tim Ziemer, hopes to extend 
GHSA’s project to 2025. Many people attribute the GHSA’s work to the financial support of 
Western nations. This large of a project requires enormous amounts of money, and “[t]he $1 
billion pot” that the United States allocated between the CDC “runs out in 2019” (Yong, 2018) 
Without financial support, the international nations that rely on the GHSA for public health 
program support and progress will no longer have any access to funding for capacity building 
projects. Ed Yong, a science journalist says that, “[t]ime and again, diseases flare up, 
governments throw money at the problem, the crisis recedes, and funding dries up. It happened 
after anthrax attacks in 2001 alerted people to the risk of bioterrorism. It happened in 2003, after 
sars showed people how quickly a new disease could spread around the globe. The world is 
caught in a cycle of panic and neglect” (Yong, 2018). One of the many issues of treating health 
as a security threat is that it relies on financial and bipartisan support. Western governments get 
to decide where and when health support should be given, but without the money, hospitals can’t 
be built, and bio surveillance will not increase. 
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The Global Health Security Agenda's three pronged approach is aimed to prevent, detect 
and respond. In order to prevent unintentional or intentional epidemics, the project aims to 
govern food safety, stop emerging drug resistant microbes and zoonotic diseases, promote 
biosafety and biosecurity systems, and create mass immunization programs (CDC, 2017). The 
GHSA detects by strengthening real time biosurveillance, increasing sample sharing, developing 
and strengthening laboratory systems, and deploying a successful biosurveillance team (CDC, 
2017). And lastly, the GHSA works to respond to infectious diseases by developing emergency 
operation centers and improving access to medical supplies during an epidemic (CDC, 2017). 
While preventing, detecting, and responding to infectious diseases is important, the shift to 
global health securitization is extremely problematic, and daunting. So, is the Global Health 
Security Agenda really the best program for combating infectious diseases? Does treating health 
as a security threat work? Would building hospitals, creating mass vaccination programs, 
increasing surveillance, and increasing sample sharing be successful at stopping the next 
epidemic? And, are infectious diseases really the biggest burden on global health?  
This answer is complicated, but in a short sense, every question answers no. Approaching 
gaps in public health systems is important, but the Global Health Security Agenda will not likely 
see the success it is hoping to bring. The project’s goal of securing Americans from diseases by 
focusing on building hospitals, creating new technology, and sending "SWAT" teams to watch 
over villages most at risk is not what countries need in order to combat infectious diseases. 
Addressing gaps in public health systems is necessary to a certain extent, but the amount at 
which the Global Health Security Agenda does is unnecessary and unproductive. Responding to 
infectious diseases is sometimes more social and political than it is scientific, and with a focus on 
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security, the GHSA fails to recognize the actual obstacles that allow infectious diseases to spread. 
Further along, this paper will aim to use three cases of infectious diseases, Ebola, Zika and 
Influenza, to prove that the Global Health Security Agenda efforts will not aim to secure America 
from all the looming infectious diseases in developing nations. But if the Global Health Security 
Agenda won’t protect Americans against health threats, then why is the program so concentrated 
on global health securitization? 
Historically, this project seems very flawed. The GHSA's huge effort to eliminate the 
threat of bioterrorism and health threats is dramatic. Although SARS, Ebola, HIV and other 
diseases should start an urgent conversation to decide what measures are necessary to take in 
order to eradicate disease, designing a project to secure Western nations from the developing 
world's infectious diseases undermines the importance of treating disease prevention and 
eradication as a humanitarian cause.  
Since the end of the Cold War and the falling of civil conflicts since 1989, many global 
leaders have been in favor of expanding foreign policy and development into a security agenda, 
and further triggered a shift in security theory (Grooves, 2007). But, securitization, which is 
ultimately the process of government's transforming their state affairs into matters of security, is 
largely debated about, since most of the security matters receive ample amount of attention and 
funding, even if there is no proof that they are a major threat. Key triggers like cyberwar, 
terrorism, bio threats, “widening gaps in wealth distribution, … a decline in traditional or 
conventional warfare; and a rise in threats to states posed by asymmetric, terrorist, and ethnically 
or religiously rationalized violence...has come against a backdrop of radically shifting 
transnational threats to states, rich and poor alike” (Garrett, 2015). As a result, governments and 
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key policy leaders are attempting to think of security as much more than just the military’s 
emergency defense for state protection, in hopes to be prepared for the next global threat. This 
means that today, the American military and government is involved in just about everything, 
including the responsibility for global health.  
Rich, Western nations, policy makers and the American government all worry about the 
threats infectious diseases pose. Economically, socially and politically, diseases are a burden. 
They threaten the stability of countries, weaken economies, military/government forces, and 
harm social structures. In a post 9/11 world, securitization has become very common among 
foreign aid and development. Newly emerging diseases like SARS, MERS, re-emerging diseases 
like Ebola and Dengue, increased population and mobility, environmental change, bioterrorism 
and terrorist organizations have all contributed to the rise of health security (Mcinnes & Kelly, 
2012, p.131). Infectious diseases like SARS and Ebola, the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Sub Saharan 
Africa and the use of pathogens by terrorist organizations all impact the flow of international 
relations and have the potential to harm the economic and political stability of nations. Because 
of this, and the growing interconnectedness, one nation's problem soon become every nation's 
problem. This means, without a secure global health program, the entire world could be affected 
for a pandemic. For governments around the world, security and the military is an extremely 
important, and complex, matter which is treated as a top priority. As America has faced 
unfamiliar threats like cyberspace, viruses, and terrorism, the government has increasingly 
viewed each new security threat through the lens of war. And as this happens, the military is 
asked to take on tasks outside of the traditional protocols of military personnel, some of which 
they are not trained to perform. Military personnel are not typically trained to handle pandemics, 
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and by using the military for this job, it undermines the ability for the progression of health 
professional’s work. Because of this higher budgets are needed to fill the tasks of the military, 
which in turn, cuts developmental work that could be successful at promoting health programs. 
Framing everything as a security threat, including infectious diseases, poses severe problems for 
the progress of social and political structures, and will only create more programs like the Global 
Health Security Agenda, which fail to recognize the actual problems which give rise to emerging 
epidemics. So what’s the problem with treating infectious diseases as a security threat?  
The history between security and health has traditionally been linked to armed conflict 
and the protection of soldiers during war time (Mcinnes & Kelly, 2012 p. 130). During wars and 
exploration, diseases like cholera, measles, and smallpox were considered a great threat to win 
war or explore unknown worlds, and was designed to secure both soldiers and explorers from 
contracting exotic diseases, which harm the progression of governmental progress. But while it 
killed soldiers in battle, it was also considered a security threat back home by impeding on 
economic and social progress. Still today, there is concern for soldier's health, but it has 
transformed into treating every infectious diseases as a security threat for Americans. This lens is 
focused largely on protecting domestic borders, stopping bioterrorism, dodging mass casualties, 
and desperately avoiding any economic disasters as a result of disease.  
Health securitization is not necessarily a new concept, but it is now discussed more 
seriously and actively, while also expanding in both the academic and policy field. Starting in 
January 2000, the UN Security Council discussed HIV/AIDS as a security threat (Mcinnes & 
Kelly, 2012, p. 131). The following year the September 11th attack and the deliberate spread of 
anthrax took place, elevating the conversation of health towards security. With the many 
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international security conflicts, the American government began to frame every health obstacle 
into America's new war.  This also makes it more and more difficult for the American 
government to understand what should and shouldn't be considered the job of the military, in 
order to further protect American prosperity against international threats.  
The debate on global health security has been pulled in different directions since the start. 
Governments treat health as a security issue in order to protect their domestic affairs, in hopes to 
also protect their their citizens by maintaining a stable economy and political environment. 
While this is important during wartime, in a health perspective this become an enormous issue. 
Infectious diseases like HIV, Ebola, Zika, etc. are not security matters. They are humanitarian 
matters. While governments treat health as a security issue, they begin to forget the determinants 
of health, and the importance of a strong, and stable healthcare system. Organizations like the 
United Nations Development Program argue that health should be treated as an individual right 
and “...should be based not on states but on people; not just on the economic well-being but on 
health, education and basic freedoms; and that security was more than the protection of national 
boundaries” (Mcinnes & Kelly, 2012, p.130 ). The philosophy that health should be viewed as 
humanitarian cause, rather than national security is important. By securitizing health, 
governments around the world do not have to promote basic human rights to clean water, food 
and access to healthcare for all. Security doesn’t provide adequate and basic public health 
programs for individuals, but instead attempts to protect those who already have these luxuries 
from those who are at most risk.  
Still today politicians believe that infectious diseases are a threat to American security. 
The U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) predicted that,“AIDS and malaria alone will 
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reduce gross domestic product (GDP) in several sub-Saharan African countries by 20 per- cent or 
more by 2010, and at the micro-level, would have such a devastating impact on villages and 
families that HIV will strain the ability of the extended family system to cope and will contribute 
to higher levels of dissatisfaction, crime, and political volatility” (Garrett, 2015). For one, Sub 
Saharan African countries have been dealing with corruption, crime and political instability for 
much of their existence, so the NIC claiming their GDP will drop because of HIV is not exactly 
an American threat. Yes, infectious diseases can harm the economic potential for African nations. 
But instead of policy leaders claiming infectious diseases cause poverty, etc, the real truth is that 
poverty, political corruption, lack of education, gender inequality, causes infectious diseases.  
So why does it matter if health is viewed as a security issue? Because, health is a 
humanitarian cause. The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) relies on sending military 
personnel to build ebola wards and track the next possible emerging pandemic threat. But, this is 
not the military’s job. As America shifted out of post Cold war, and 9/11 times, it became harder 
and harder to tell what is and isn’t the enemy, which involved the military in non war duty jobs. 
Developmental and humanitarian workers criticize military personnel, saying that, “you people, 
you just have no idea what you’re doing!… You’ve got these kids, these thirty year old captains 
who spent their lives learning how to drive tanks and shoot people and they think they know how 
to end poverty in Afghanistan in six months. They don’t understand that there are people who 
actually know something about this, and its not them- they act on whatever idea happens to pop 
into their head” ( Brooks, 2016, p.95). Health securitization undermines effective solutions for 
targeting health. To truly protect America from emerging diseases, there should be effects to 
             
             
                                                                                       
                                                                                                                                          !  25
     
support strong health care systems, oppose corrupted leaders, end poverty, train health care 
workers, and support women’s empowerment.  
A program like the Global Health Security Agenda may be effective in building large, 
high tech hospitals and laboratories, but it’s perspective on health as a security threat will deter 
the government to treat these issues as humanitarian even if there is no evidence that diseases 
like, HIV/AIDS poses a real threat to national and international security (Grooves, 2007).While 
the securitization of disease attracts large amounts of funding, human rights workers fear there 
will be an increase of the politicizing of aid, and further harm and stigmatization to those 
affected by disease (Grooves, 2007). Linking health and security together comes from a long line 
of international threats and conflicts within the American government, however, the best thing 
that can be done for both international health and American protection is to eliminate the military 
from such health positions. The GHSA is effective in the sense that it attract attention towards 
the alarming rate of health inequality and the increase in emerging diseases, but many people 
fear that with such a program, the conflicts from diseases like Ebola, Zika and Influenza will 
only increase.  
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Literature Review  
Most of my sources for this research paper come from books, news articles and scientific 
papers. One of the most important things I found was that the sources were written as recent as 
possible. Because global health conversations and policies are constantly changing, it was crucial 
for me to find recent research, proof and diseases to backup my argument.  
My sources varied in opinions. Mostly all the news articles I read advocated towards a 
more holistic and humanitarian outlook on responding to infectious diseases. However, some of 
the books and older scientific research I found argued for a more security perspective on 
infectious diseases interventions. While I don't agree with this argument, I think it is important to 
read about both opinions. This made it more complicated to form an argument, however it also 
made me reflect more about the topic and eventually come up with an even stronger argument.  
While all of my sources were important in understanding the problems surrounding 
infectious diseases, my life experiences also helped me come up with a concerte argument. 
Traveling and speaking to my friends from all over the world helped me to think of health as 
more of a humanitarian issue. Living in the United States, it is easy to forget about how not 
everything should be dealt with through the military. And I hope this paper can allow someone to 
think the same thing.  
Overall, my articles and sources were extremely crucial for me to understand the theme. 
Most of the written work I used advocates for the same thing I do, which I used to create a more 
specific argument. I used the Global Health Security Agenda to further claim my argument.  
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        Chapter Two  
The first known Ebola virus outbreak occurred in 1976 in Yambuku, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, then named Zaire. It affected over 318 people, and killed 88% of those who 
were infected (CDC, 2017). The last known case was in 2017, also in Democratic Republic of 
Congo, in a village named Bas Uélé, but only this time it affected 8 people, and killed 4, 50% of 
those affected (CDC, 2017). On paper, this looks like a promising improvement in emergency 
disease response. But the truth is there were many failures that resulted in numerous, preventable 
deaths. By examining the 2014 Ebola outbreaks in Africa, it becomes obvious that global health 
responders are not responding adequately.  
In 2014, the Ebola virus was at its peak. It traveled across borders to nine different 
countries, including some outbreaks in the United States and several European countries, 
affected 28,616, killed 11,310 people, slowed economic progress in countries recovering from 
wars, ignited worldwide fear, and cost billions of dollars in short-term, and late disease control 
interventions (BBC, 2016.). But what went wrong? Why couldn’t the international health 
community stop this deadly virus from spreading in the 21st century? There is not just one 
answer to this question. A conglomerate of problems including political corruption, slow 
responses, inadequate resources, fear, denial from patients, distraction from other international 
conflicts, and a failure of global health responsibility have all been blamed as the reasons for this 
horrible outbreak. But, in order to fix the issues, which ignite epidemics, and ensure that the next 
outbreak is stopped, it is essential to look at failures in the 2014 Ebola outbreaks response in 
Guinea and Liberia. 
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Guinea suffered from one of the worst Ebola outbreaks. By March 2014, the virus had 
already circulated for three months without any international response present, and during that 
time, it traveled to Sierra Leone and Liberia. When Ebola emerged in Guinea, the country 
already had a very poor health care system, with, “the government spen[ding] a mere $9 per 
capita on health, with fewer than three health workers for every 20,000 people” (Erondu, 2017). 
But Guinea was still making considerable progress considering their circumstances. Before the 
Ebola outbreaks, Guinea’s under 5 mortality was steadily decreasing, as was maternal mortality, 
and even though they still have some of the highest rates of child and maternal mortality, it was 
promising to see a decrease ("Health Systems," 2014). While, these improvements were 
occurring because of the rise in disease specific interventions, and not long term responses, it 
still filled the international community with hope for Guinea. At the time, vaccine preventable 
diseases were on a decline due to mass immunizations, and specific child and maternal survival 
interventions, like food security and breast milk for children to battle malnourishment were 
successful in short term response. However, these short term interventions, like mass vaccination 
programs, and pills, can not deal with unexpected crisis and long term conflicts that come from 
wars, political instability, corruption, that allow Ebola to spread.  
Despite their progress, Guinea needed to rely on international health actors, like the 
World Health Organization (WHO), to facilitate an effective Ebola response. Countries like 
America recognized it was also important for them to respond to this “threat,” in order to 
mitigate the risk of Ebola spreading throughout the western world. However, these international 
actors, and America, proved to be inadequate and in many ways were responsible for the 
continuous spreading of Ebola.  Once the United States got involved in the Ebola interventions, 
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which was slow, it at first, looked like they would be able to stop Ebola. But while it looks good 
on paper, the reality was it was only because American health responders arrived so late to 
Guinea that the virus was already beginning to decline before they got there (Editorial Board, 
2015). Overall, there was an extreme lack of communication and coordination from the minute 
organizations like the World Health Organization arrived, and it lasted for the duration of the 
outbreak. When these organizations were first notified Ebola was circulating through West 
Africa, international health organizations like the WHO were already In Guinea. However, 
because the outbreak was considered, “small”, their expert health teams trained for emergency 
response were pulled out prematurely, leaving a country with its own weak health system, to 
fend for itself (Editorial Board, 2015). Margaret Chan, then the director of the WHO, did not 
even declare the Ebola outbreak as an international health concern (this is defined as a event that 
is declared a risk to other states, however; still does not require international response ) until five 
months after Guinea, as well as Sierra Leone notified them of cases of Ebola (World Health 
Organization, 2018). By the time this outbreak was considered a global emergency in August 
2014, the response teams arrived too late and were inadequately trained to deal with the cultural 
conditions in Western Africa, which proved to be an enormous obstacle for controlling the virus.  
In the Guinean Ebola outbreak, there was not only a lack of communication, late 
response, and inadequate health workers, but because of this, there was a total breakdown of a 
holistic approach. The Guinean government did not give citizens a warning, so when American 
health workers and the American military arrived, so did national fear. Guinea lacks a robust 
health care system, so when health workers arrived in remote areas, the locals were not used to 
foreign health workers and did not recognize this strange new disease. The local health workers, 
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who were working there before the disease arrived, should have warned the people and villages 
about Ebola. This would have helped spread public education of the disease and lead to a 
positive behavior towards Ebola. For example, some local populations believe that the day you 
die is the most important day of your life, thus, washing and dressing the body is essential for 
burial, which clearly does help with Ebola containment, since the virus is spread through contact. 
But, while the virus can be extremely dangerous, it is not nearly as contagious as people think it 
is. Ebola is transmitted through direct contact with "bodily fluids, blood, feces, vomit, semen, 
breast milk and urine—as well as the sweat of people who are very sick with Ebola and corpses; 
thus, Ebola, without direct contact, is a fairly self limiting disease" (World Health Organization, 
2018). This means that the real issues were in the lack of public education of Ebola and panicked 
communities. Because of this, many people fled, and the ones who stayed to respond to the 
crisis, did so out of fear, which is detrimental for Ebola containment. 
The Ebola outbreak in Guinea was hardly a surprise. But it’s important to understand 
that infectious diseases like Ebola ravage through countries like Guinea that have poor health 
systems due to chronic poverty, civil war, political corruption, and a lack of skilled health 
workers and doctors. When Ebola broke out in Guinea, the local doctors were not prepared to 
respond alone, not because they didn't have enormous laboratories to test for Ebola, but because 
their was simply not a strong health care system that could also work with local health clinics to 
mitigate fear. Even with a high tech laboratory, Ebola wouldn't have been stopped in the very 
beginning. In the first few months, Ebola spread without health organizations even knowing, and 
as the international community has learned, the first few months are extremely critical in 
controlling the virus. Even though the Guinean outbreak was relatively short, but extremely fatal; 
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because of the weak response in Guinea, Ebola was able to spread to Liberia, as well as Sierra 
Leone. Effective outbreak response does not just come from the health systems. It also relies on 
the people to communicate with health workers, and to trust their recommendations to stop it 
from spreading. 
One village in Guinea, showed how important it is for government health workers to 
rebuild community trust. Instead of setting up health centers in the capital, the health responders 
pitched tents and community clinics that served to facilitate responses and build trust with the 
locals. They also trained local responders, staffed local villages with health trained workers, and 
engaged, supported and informed local people about Ebola (Erondu, 2017). The results were 
better than expected, “[there was] exceptional community collaboration. Many of those who had 
been in contact with the girl [who was infected with Ebola] voluntarily quarantined themselves, 
received vaccinations, and let us monitor their health for the duration of the flare-up” (Erondu, 
2017). This example emphasizes the importance of binding trust and communication between 
responders and victims, and how community support can be more effective than many other 
tactics. The outbreaks in Guinea should have served as an important lesson for disease outbreak, 
but it only got worse in Liberia.  
The Ebola outbreak in Liberia couldn’t have gone any worse. By the end, thousands of 
people would die, the country would again be set back from economic progress, the distrust 
between the people and government would get worse, and a country suffering from a long brutal 
history would remain broken. Politics, distrust and panic all fueled the Liberian-Ebola outbreaks. 
Looking back at the country’s history, it becomes obvious that the Ebola outbreaks would have 
occurred. Liberia, a country founded by freed American and Caribbean slaves, has only recently 
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come out of several brutal civil wars. In 2006, only three years after the end of Liberia’s fourteen 
year war, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a US-educated Liberian, was elected as the president, and 
remained in power until 2017. During her term, the Ebola outbreak substantially impeded 
Liberia’s rapidly growing economic rate. But while she was popular in the West, she was accused 
of political corruption back home in Liberia, where eventually she lost all trust from her people. 
In the everyday life of a Liberian, there was still mass unemployment, extreme poverty, 
corruption in everyday life, and struggling agriculture and health systems (BBC, 2016). Between 
widespread political distrust, and an emerging virus, this was a recipe for disaster. 
When Ebola spread from Guinea to Liberia the first outbreak didn’t last very long, and 
health officials wondered if the virus had managed to stop itself. But a few months later, it spread 
to Monrovia, the capital, and this time it was spread all over different parts of the city. With help 
from the CDC and Doctors Without Borders (MSF), the Liberian government,  
“... warned the public through radio announcements, posters, and 
billboards, and sent health workers to villages throughout the 
country to tell people to be on the lookout for the disease. They set 
up a hotline so people could report cases and trained teams of 
investigators to visit each caller and make a tentative diagnosis 
based on symptoms. They also equipped a lab to do blood tests 
locally and built Ebola treatment centers—tent camps where 
patients could be isolated and receive basic care. They hired over 
two thousand contact tracers to identify and isolate everyone—
such as close relatives of victims and health workers—who might 
have been exposed to the virus” (Epstein, 2014).  
Previously, this system worked to control more than a handful of Ebola outbreaks in Sub-
Saharan Africa, but this time around it didn’t seem to stop the outbreaks in Monrovia. Liberians 
were simply not responding as the CDC, MSF and the Liberian government hoped they would. 
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Even though the hotline was ringing constantly notifying the government of new cases, it would 
be impossible to contain with each infected person having over thirty contacts (Epstein, 2014). 
Across the border, Ebola was still killing Guineans and Krio (peoples from Sierra Leone), but it 
wasn’t spreading this rapidly in their capitals. It took four months, thousands of lives taken, and 
an Ebola outbreak twice the size of the Guinea outbreak, for it to subside in Liberia (Epstein, 
2014).  
The outbreak in Liberia was clearly very different from that in Guinea. While there 
was also a weak health care system, the problem lay partly in political instability. When a 
country like Liberia, with a Nobel peace prize winning, Harvard and World Bank trained 
president, has an Ebola outbreak, it can look surprising. But the truth is that it was fairly 
predictable. When Ebola hit Liberia, there was little trust between the people and the 
government. Sirleaf had been accused of corruption, so when Ebola rampaged villages with 
already minimal healthcare systems, Liberians believed she’d either made it up to raise money 
from the UN, or even created it to kill them, and that nurses were poisoning people so that the 
UN would send money (Parshley, 2016). Even when health workers came to care for the sick, 
most of the time they were shouted at, abused or even killed, preventing them from doing any 
work (Parshley, 2016). For the most part, Liberians can’t be blamed for thinking this either. But, 
when political corruption emerges during an epidemic, responding to a virus like Ebola, becomes 
even more difficult. 
One hypothesis for the horrific and large outbreaks is that the Liberian government and 
the health systems was that Liberia was too ill equipped, meaning they didn't have enough labs, 
hospitals etc, to contain the outbreak domestically. While it is true that both Guinea and Liberia 
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have weak health systems, this can’t be the only reason. So why was it that in places like Sudan 
and Congo, with similarly poor health systems, had been able to rapidly contained viruses, but 
Liberia was having an enormous outbreak? If the outbreak was not political or social then the 
international health workers should have been able to contain the outbreak. These are people 
whom have experience and success in containing previous outbreaks all over Sub Saharan 
Africa. But, there was something different about Liberia. While in most African countries there is 
distrust in government, Liberia’s was more prominent. Liberia was supposed to be emerging out 
of a long, bloody history by regaining trust and building their economy. The last thing Liberia 
needed was Ebola.  
There is a reason why Ebola rampages in only certain countries. The virus started in 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and the most recent case was still there. If it was really as 
contagious as everyone says, then more than just three African countries would have been 
severely affected. Clearly, viruses jump from border to border, but it only stays in the weakest 
places. Countries that have weak healthcare systems, distrust in their government, extreme 
poverty, corrupted leaders and economic decline are often the most likely places where emerging 
infectious disease spread. The problem isn’t that the WHO, or governments don’t know how to 
respond, but that viruses spreading are linked with larger governance issues, which are not 
amenable to a quick fix, but rather involve behavior and political change. In Guinea’s case, the 
WHO failed. One of its most important jobs is to provide early warnings. Even when WHO 
officials were notified, their response was slow and indecisive, which delayed a concerted, 
forceful response. Ebola circulated for three months in Guinea without one person to notify 
health officials; so when the Guinean government was notified, they tried to play down the 
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seriousness in hopes to avoid widespread panic and fear (Editorial Board, 2015). Liberia’s 
outbreak was even worse. This time it wasn’t necessarily a slow response and inadequate 
communication that led Liberia to chaos, but instead their current political environment. The 
Liberian government and the international health response teams together failed to respond to the 
cultural obstacles. Apparently nobody realized how important it would be to build trust with 
Liberians, which would diminish fear, increase communication, and ultimately stop the virus by 
itself. 
Even though Ebola is the same in every country it affects, establishing the same 
response in every environment is not very effective. While most of these countries have poor 
health care systems; building laboratories, giving them high tech resources and having scary men 
in white suits and black boots carrying guns around to “detect” future viruses, won’t be the 
solution. Sure, having more educated doctors and better equipped hospitals are important to build 
capacity, what’s the point of having all of that if the people believe the government is trying to 
kill them? Nobody would voluntarily go to the hospital with rumors like those. The solution is 
often further back, and less scientific than one would think. Establishing trust in governments, 
creating community clinics, educating the public and having a transparent health system proves 
to be successful in containing epidemics like Ebola. Even though building huge hospitals and 
involving the military seems like the most logical and easiest thing to do, it couldn’t be farther 
from what’s best for global health.  
Looking back on the international response of Ebola, it becomes quite obvious that a 
program like the Global Health Security Agenda, whose goal is to protect Americans from 
emerging infectious disease threat, wouldn't be successful. While Ebola is a virus, health 
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organizations and ministries often forget that people, their responses, and trust in their 
government to solve these conflicts, along with a strong and transparent health care system, are 
what's most important. Obstacles, such as governmental structures, lack of trained doctors and 
poor health care systems also proved to fuel the epidemic. As shown in this chapter, the most 
effective mechanism for stopping Ebola would be to have community mobilization, 
communication and a local, trusted health system already there, that locals would listen to. The 
GHSA is a program that undermines the importance of local, strong health care systems and 
widens a further gap between government and health organizations. Ebola for many reasons is 
not a security threat to America. For one, Ebola is not that easily transmitted and the rate of the 
virus wiping out America, and western cities, is extremely unlikely. America has a basic health 
care system, which most people rely on for anything from a cold to serious infectious disease 
issues. Those patients typically trust their health support, and will listen to them if they're 
quarantined or asked to limit direct contact with others. While laboratories and hospitals are 
important, in an African country, an infectious disease could spread for weeks before the health 
ministry would know about, or even diagnose. While America's Global Health Security Agenda 
is good at bringing attention and financial resources to infectious diseases, it removes Ebola as a 
humanitarian conflict, and replaces it in the category of  security threat.  
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Chapter Three:  
 Zika, like Ebola, was discovered long before the most recent, and media covered, 
outbreaks. Zika, an arthropod-borne virus was first recognized in 1947, in Uganda. While during 
that time, the virus was isolated in rhesus monkeys and the Aedes africanus mosquito, seven 
years later scientists discovered the first human zika virus, in Nigeria (Musso, 2015). It wouldn’t 
be until 2007 for the first large outbreak of Zika to occur, and thus begin to spread across the 
world.  
Currently scientists believe that this single strand RNA virus has two lineages: African 
and Asian (Musso, 2015). The Asian lineage was linked to some of the first outbreaks, which 
then gave rise to the virus in the Pacific and South American region. Zika virus is originally 
transmitted by the bite of an infected female mosquito, however it has adapted to use humans as 
reservoirs and urban mosquitoes as vectors (Musso, 2015). This means Zika is transmitted as a 
zoonotic disease, from animal to human, as well as from human to human. Some common forms 
of transmission are, being bitten by an infected mosquito, sexual intercourse, blood transfusions 
and mother to child.  
The first large, globally known, outbreak was on the island, Yap in the Federated States 
of Micronesia. In 2007, Zika infected forty-nine confirmed humans on the small island, however 
scientists estimate that it actually infected over 73% of the population, over 7,500 people, 
because of close contact (Musso, 2015). During this outbreak, records were not kept or 
organized, so hospitalizations, deaths and birth defects are still uncertain. The second outbreak 
occurred in French Polynesia in 2013. During that time there were 28,000 consultations for Zika 
fever, affecting 11% of the population, and thus spread to New Caledonia, Cook Islands, Eastern 
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Island, Vanuatu, Solomon and Fiji (Musso, 2015). Like the first outbreak on Yap, due to the 
insufficient record keeping, there is still a lot unknown about the cases in the Pacific region. 
While Zika affected entire islands during the first few outbreaks, it wasn’t until the 2015 
Brazilian and American outbreaks, that there was worldwide attention and major concern. The 
same strain affecting Brazil was found in the Pacific outbreaks, suggesting that the Brazilian-
Zika outbreaks were from the Pacific. Other, smaller outbreaks occurred around the Americas, 
and Europe from travelers returning from infected areas.  
While Zika can severely affect a person’s health, causing Guillain-Barré Syndrome, 
microcephaly, and severe neurological damage, most people have milder experiences. Zika for 
the most part is a self-limiting disease, and because some symptoms are so mild, people often 
aren’t even aware they’re infected. Some symptoms include, “mild fever, fatigue, cutaneous 
rash,... and conjunctivitis. Other reported symptoms are headache, malaise, dizziness, oedema of 
the extremities, retro orbital pain, anorexia, photophobia, gastrointestinal disorders, sore throat, 
cough, aphthous ulcers, back pain, sweating and lymphadenopathies” (Musso, 2015). However 
none of these symptoms are specific just to Zika, so they are often misdiagnosed as a viral or 
bacterial infection. Currently there are a few vaccines under trial to prevent future outbreaks. It is 
important to point out that because of misdiagnoses, improper record keeping and impoverished 
areas having minimal access to care, the Zika occurrences are probably more common than they 
are reported (Musso, 2015).  
Since 2015, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) reported that over thirty-five 
countries in the Americas have reported that Zika was present from mosquitos (Phelan, 2016). 
Places like Puerto Rico and Rio De Janeiro, Brazil had large amounts of Zika infected mosquitos, 
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and with the olympics in 2016, the American government was worried about it spreading to 
“Florida and the Gulf Coast states... with the potential to affect up to 30 states, as far north as 
Washington, DC, Philadelphia, and New York City. Pregnant women, particularly those in lower 
socioeconomic status groups in the southern US, are at heightened risk” (Phelan, 2016). This is 
true even outside of the United States. The majority of people that had serious effects of Zika 
were in Central and South America being black, young, poor mothers, who would eventually 
give birth to children with microcephaly or other birth defects. There were many missed 
opportunities for stopping Zika, and a disproportionate number of young mothers and their 
children will have lifelong health issues and enormous medical bills because of inadequate 
support and interventions provided to these women. In many ways, like Ebola, the Zika 
preparedness and response interventions failed.  
On the outside, the response to Zika was much different from Ebola primarily because of 
how differently the two viruses spread. However, the interventions, lack of preparedness, and 
failed ability to recognize the larger socio-economic issue makes it seem like Ebola and Zika 
were handled similarly. While, Ebola can spread from direct human contact, Zika cannot, unless 
through mother-to-child transmission or sexual intercourse. On one hand, this makes the virus’s 
ability to spread, slower, but on the other hand, it becomes a lot harder to stop since the source of 
the virus is in mosquitos, which are able to multiply quickly and fly long distances. This sort of 
intervention heavily relies on local governments and the support of citizens, to stop the virus, the 
mosquitoes breeding grounds, but most of all support lower socio-economic classes which were 
disproportionately affected.  
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Again, the main actors involved in preparing and responding to this epidemic, did not 
make the right choices. The American government stalled passing a Zika-funding bill in 
Congress for over seven months, to help fight the spreading of the diseases, knowing well that 
the slow response would have consequences that could affect large numbers of children with 
birth defects (Kodjak, 2016). At that point, Kodjak wrote that, "more than 23,000 in the mainland 
US and Puerto Rico have contracted the Zika virus… that includes more than 2,000 pregnant 
women" (Kodjak, 2016). While the WHO declared Zika as an emergency early on, they also 
prematurely ended their interventions. But really the worst was that most governments and 
international organizations failed to support the millions of women, especially those who were 
pregnant, in slums that were the most at-risk. Many governments never even warned mothers to 
postpone their pregnancies, which Amir Attaran, a professor of law and medicine at the 
University of Ottawa, calls, “[a] hideously racist hypocrisy....“[f]emale American tourists were 
given the best and safest public health advice, while brown Puerto Rican inhabitants were told 
something else entirely” (McNEIL, 2016). While Zika affected millions of women, the most 
neglected were poor mothers in the Caribbean and Central and South America.  
In many ways, the response to Malaria was handled similarly. Just like Zika, early on, 
governments introduced the use of chemicals to attempt to kill mosquitos. However, even before 
the Zika outbreaks, the introduction of DDT, a mosquito-killing chemical, was successful in 
terms of destroying domestic Malaria, even though it did have harmful side effects on the health 
of the environment and humans. But it took years until America realized that using DDT was 
more harmful than beneficial, and that the mosquitos will return, this time with pesticide 
resistance. In the end, these issues were so widespread- that the international community 
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practically abandoned the malaria campaign. Halfway through, the global malaria cases 
increased by two folds, and countries such as China saw one million cases, and India 6 million 
malaria cases (Garrett, 1994, p. 52). Just like Malaria, Zika proved to be extremely hard to 
control with only chemicals. 
When Zika arrived in the Caribbean and the Americas, local governments as well as 
international health organizations gave horrible advice and offered minimal support to people 
most affected by Zika. Truck sprayed chemicals, attempting to kill mosquitos, which didn’t even 
offer research for long term success. Most health offices never offered abortions as a serious 
option for pregnant women infected with Zika. But, it wasn’t only local health authorities that 
deterred women from abortions, but also the WHO and CDC, saying that, “... to do so would 
interfere with women’s reproductive rights or prevent older women from conceiving in time to 
have children…  [and that it is] not a government doctor’s job to tell women what to do with 
their bodies” (McNEIL, 2016). While it is not a government's job to advise women on what to do 
with their bodies, it is their job to provide support and realistic options for women suffering from 
disease and hardship. Most health officials were fearful of offending religious conservatives, and 
thus were not able to pubic display abortion, contraceptives, and delaying pregnancies as a 
realistic option for women at most risk. Director of Minnesota’s Center for Infectious Disease 
Research and Policy, says, “the CDC always gets in trouble with Congress when it talks about 
contraceptives or bullets… By the latter, he meant that it was hard for the officials to point out 
that gunshots are a major cause of American deaths for fear of offending the gun 
lobby” (McNEIL, 2016). Although guns have nothing to do with Zika,  the two issues can be 
looked at in the same perspective. Just like guns, contraceptives and abortion are difficult for 
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congress to discuss for fear of cut funding. This was especially true for the Zika response, since 
the virus was affecting places like Brazil, which happens to have the largest number of Catholics 
in the world.  
 While places like Brazil and Puerto Rico did not have their priorities set straight in order 
to stop the virus, neither did the American government and European countries. Most public 
awareness was focused on mosquito prevention, even though “not one of the nearly 1,000 cases 
diagnosed there by year’s end was transmitted by a local mosquito” ( McNEIL, 2016). For 
Europe and America, this made no sense, since there were not large numbers of infected 
mosquitoes present. Health departments should have been focused Zika transmitted from sexual 
transmission or travel. The only place that responded adequately was Miami. The health 
departments sprayed insecticide and larvacide, and went from house to house looking for 
mosquito breeding sites (McNEIL, 2016). Even though this worked for Miami, it doesn’t mean 
this would work for every place infected with Zika. In places like Brazil, doctors acted quickly 
when Zika hit but were “often thwarted by the country’s political and economic chaos”(McNEIL, 
2016). Because of Brazil’s political instability, after their former president Dilma Rousseff was 
impeached, following a corruption scandal, the country’s economy was in chaos. Again, this has 
proved to create obstacles for healthcare progress. Like Liberia, Brazil had many other political 
factors that were unaccounted for in trying to eliminate Zika. Even though Former president 
Rousseff warned Brazil of Zika, her popularity was low, it wasn't taken with severity or urgency. 
The Zika outbreaks highlight the difficulties of low socio-economic women in Latin 
America. Margaret Chan, the director of the WHO revealed that, “Zika revealed fault lines in the 
world’s collective preparedness. Poor access to family planning services was one. The 
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dismantling of national programmes for mosquito control was another” (Stone, 2017). Women 
have restricted access to reproductive and sexual rights, and have a lack of education about 
contraceptives, unwanted pregnancies and women’s health. Even though Brazil claims to have a 
right to healthcare, many poor women are unable to access prenatal care, testing, and abortions, 
which are highly illegal. In Brazil alone, “[c]landestine abortions remain too necessary, resulting 
in needless deaths—the fourth leading cause of maternal death, per HRW. Tragically, since 2005, 
about 17% of these abortion-related deaths were in young girls and women only 10-19 years old” 
(Stone, 2017). The unequal social environment of Brazil proved to be an extremely big obstacle 
in responding to the Zika outbreaks. Because of their strict laws on reproduction in Brazil, those 
who were affected most by Zika, such as young, poor, pregnant women, were not able to get the 
proper care or options that were provided to white Americans and Europeans.  
While women suffered the most, it was even worse for women in poor slums. Because 
mosquitos breed in sitting water, and slums often have inadequate access to clean water and 
sanitation, these were perfect breeding grounds for Zika. While projects to spray pesticides 
provide a short term relief, they aren’t a long term solution, since some mosquitos are becoming 
resistant. Judy Stone, an infectious disease specialist and author, says that,  
“[m]ore than one-third of Brazil’s population 
lacks access to a continuous water supply. So women 
store water in containers that might become breeding 
grounds for the mosquitoes. Poor sanitation leaves 
standing water and sewage, which again serve as 
breeding grounds for the [mosquitos]. Both of these 
problems disproportionately affect poor 
communities…and women again bear most of the 
responsibility to try to implement burdensome 
attempts to eliminate standing water, which will likely 
be futile” (Stone, 2017). 
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The Brazilian government and international health organization lack in addressing the underlying 
issues, allowed Zika to spread.  
Proper education for both women, as well as men, on the transmission of Zika could have 
helped slow the Zika outbreaks. Legal abortion access would not only progress towards equality 
between men and women, but also give women the choice to control her future. One of the 
biggest issues in the Zika virus response was that there was a huge emphasis on killing 
mosquitoes and their breeding grounds, rather than education and support on reproduction and 
risk of transmission. Instead of concentrating so strongly on the transmission of Zika by 
mosquitoes, “more emphasis needs to be placed on fixing structural problems. Further, funds for 
education and health were frozen. As appears universally true, poor, disadvantaged women are 
disproportionately affected” (Stone, 2017). Another solution could be a vaccine, which would 
provide poor women with protection from such viruses. But while this is true, it doesn’t solve the 
actual issues which fuel diseases like Zika, such as gender inequality, lack of women’s education 
on reproduction, contaminated water, and political instability.  
Handing money to Brazil to provide insecticides and find mosquitoes breeding grounds 
will only keep the virus away for so long. By the government supporting, educating and giving 
access to proper health, specifically for women, there will be improvements not only in health 
but also the social environment. While organizations like the CDC and WHO were present and 
attempting to provide care for those affected and at most risk, the real solution would have been 
to support and provide education for men and women on sexual transmission, women’s 
reproductive rights, access to safe abortions, and care for affected mother’s and their babies. So 
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no matter how much funding goes to surveillance, the real solution won’t be solved unless 
political, social, and economic progress is made within the countries affected. 
 The Zika response was imperfect in many ways. But the most important lesson to come 
out of it was how it highlights the difficulties of women, especially non-white women in poverty. 
Because Zika is transmitted differently than a virus, like Ebola, which is transmitted through 
direct contact, the solution to stopping Zika was put into a different perspective. Health 
organizations needed a short term solution, before the virus spread even further, which meant 
most of their attention was towards killing mosquitos. Without a vaccine, men and women in 
favelas, Brazilian slums, and women without the basic care and education are sitting ducks 
waiting to contract Zika. Looking forward, a program like the Global Health Security Agenda 
would fail to response to the actual issues, like poverty, gender discrimination and lack of a basic 
health care system. While the GHSA could provide funding to spray communities in attempt to 
kill the mosquito grounds, it would fail to support the thousands of men, women and children 
who live without a robust, local health care system. Providing laboratories, sending teams of 
military personnel and building hospitals wouldn't be the solution. This zoonotic borne disease 
breeds in standing waters and unsanitary conditions, which is mostly found in tropic slums. The 
long term solution for Zika is addressing the social and political obstacles that stand in the way 
of creating a solid and transparent health care system. While the Global Health Security Agenda 
strives to protect Americans from infectious diseases like Zika, there really is no evidence that 
supports the claim that Zika could do economic harm to the United States. Compared to the 
Caribbean, the few cases that did hit America were mainly in Miami, and they were addressed 
quickly and managed to control the outbreak. American, pregnant, soon-to-be, mothers who were 
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infected were supported and given the option to terminate the pregnancy. The GHSA's tactic to 
treat Zika as a security threat will not help to slow future outbreaks. The solution to infectious 
diseases like this, are unique and different in every country, or community, it hits. The best 
answer is not treating Zika like it is a economic, political and social threat to the United States, 
but support women in impoverished communities, provide them strong, local health and 
reproductive clinics and safely combat the breeding grounds for mosquitos.  
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Chapter Four:  
While most people probably think catching the flu is just a week of a dealing with a 
runny nose and a fever, Influenza is actually much more complicated and has managed to kill 
large amounts of people since the early 20th century. There are currently three different types of 
influenza, A, B, and C, and many subtypes like H1N1 and Avian Flu. One of the deadliest flu 
pandemics occurred in 1918, infected 500 million people, killed 20 to 50 million people 
worldwide, and infected 675,000 Americans (Fineberg, 2014). Between then and now, there are 
often flu outbreaks that are small compared to the Spanish flu of 1918, but in 2009 there was a 
rather large outbreak of H1N1, commonly referred to the 2009 flu pandemic. 
The first laboratory tested case of H1N1 occurred in Mexico, in 2009, and two months 
later, there were several confirmed cases of the the strain H1N1, spreading into California           
(Finberg, 2014). The virus spread extremely fast, and “[b]y the end of April, cases had been 
reported in a number of U.S. states and in countries on various continents, including Canada, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Israel, and Germany. On April 25, invoking its 
authority under the 2005 IHR, the WHO declared a public health emergency of international 
concern and convened the emergency committee called for in the regulations” (Fineberg, 2014). 
Since H1N1 is spread through the air, meaning it can spread by sneezing, coughing, touching, or 
just being in close proximity to an infected person, the flu traveled way too fast for health 
officials, not giving them much time for the international community to respond before it was a 
global pandemic. By June 9th, 2009, the WHO declared this outbreak to be a pandemic, which 
infected 73 countries and had reported more than 26,000 individual cases. ( World Health 
Organization, 2018,) 
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When H1N1 was first discovered in Mexico, it seemed a lot smaller than it actually was 
at the time, and not many people were  aware of the scale they were going to deal with. One 
study showed that over 899 hospitalized patients, 58 people (6.5%) became critically ill, and of 
those, 41% died (Fineberg, 2014). Over the years, there were some countries that were affected 
enormously, and a lot more than other countries, which made it extremely confusing how to 
display a global, public message about the virus. America was hit much harder than Europe, and 
places like Argentina had very severe cases while, right next door Chile had only a small amount 
of cases. This confused governments and health organizations whether or not to display public 
information and risk. There is still so much uncertainty around why some countries were hit 
harder than others in the H1N1 outbreaks, but regardless the WHO and IHR had to implement 
several provisions to dodge another pandemic as large as the 1918 flu. While this 2009 flu 
pandemic did not kill nearly as many people, it still was a concern for global health. 
While the IHR and WHO thought they would be successful at stopping the 2009 flu 
pandemic, by implementing tons of surveillance and records, they were realistically limited to 
respond to such a global and dispersed pandemic. Following the SARS outbreaks in Asia, the 
IHR “established systematic approaches to surveillance, early-warning systems, and response in 
member states and promoted technical cooperation and sharing of logistic support” which 
facilitated in the 2009 outbreaks (Finberg, 2014) . Other successes occurred from the IHR 
building communication among nations by implementing “national offices that would be 
responsible for rapid collection and dissemination of emerging data and guidance” (Fineberg, 
2014). But in the long run, these interventions really didn’t work for the 2009 flu epidemic. 
Because the flu was dispersed in random states, the WHO and IHR thought that they would 
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implement strategies for countries to build capacity, within their own state. These interventions 
were headed by National Focal Points, national offices that were used to encourage  and be in 
charge of facilitating coordination, information sharing and joint planning at national level by 
recording progress (Finberg, 2014). This program was a lot like a smaller version of the Global 
Health Security Agenda, which also aims to build national capacity, coordination and domestic 
intervention. But despite the IHR’s hope, it really didn’t work the way they thought. All the 
member nations who took worked below the National Focal Point did not have the capacities to 
respond alone, and didn’t show any progress that they were building their capacity. After the 
H1N1 pandemic, a study showed that,  “Of the 194 eligible states, 128 (66%) responded to a 
WHO questionnaire on their state of progress in 2011. Only 58% of the responding member 
states reported having developed national plans to meet their core capacity requirements, and 
only 10% claimed to have fully established the capacities called for in the IHR” (Fineberg, 
2014). This means that simply stated, nothing was really getting done. Nations and states did not 
end up responding to the degree that they were supposed to, even after building capacity. Other 
obstacles also prevented the National Focal Points from working. Even though the program 
attempted to provide capacity, the IHR also failed to address the issues of medical, healthcare 
accessibility, and“...encourag[ed] vaccine manufacturers to set aside a fraction of their pandemic-
vaccine production for donation and for discounted pricing in developing countries”(Fineberg, 
2014). Capacity building programs are not exactly helpful if medical care is not financially 
available to impoverished people. This was especially true for the 2009 flu pandemic. Since the 
flu is airborne, the only thing that protects people in the short run is a vaccine, and without 
developing nations and impoverished communities having access to that, it was basically useless. 
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The WHO also responded with many systematic faults. "The WHO is much better at 
responding to short-term outbreak emergencies, such as investigating an outbreak of 
hemorrhagic fever in sub-Saharan Africa, or to manage a multiyear, steady-state disease-control 
program” rather than globally dispersed pandemics. (Fineberg, 2014). Because each WHO 
offices are autonomous, with member states of the region responsible for the election of the 
regional director, budget, and program, this limits the ability of the WHO to direct a globally 
unified response during a global health emergency, especially as dispersed as this one was 
(Finberg, 2014).  
Previous to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the WHO predicted that a influenza outbreak 
would occur and thus was prepared to respond to one. They focused specifically on, “ the threat 
of avian H5N1 influenza, and a signal feature among recognized cases of H5N1 influenza in 
humans was mortality exceeding 50%” (Fineberg, 2014). But because the severity of influenza 
depends on so many factors, like the susceptibility of the population, age and previous exposure 
to influenza viruses, it was almost impossible for the WHO to know where, how bad the flu was, 
and which strain would hit. The WHO also lacked “a consistent, measurable, and understandable 
depiction of the severity of a pandemic. This situation was problematic because, regardless of the 
definition of a pandemic, the decisions about response logically depend on both spread and 
severity”(Fineberg, 2014). To say simply, it is impossible for the WHO to respond to an entire 
global pandemic alone, and since the flu severity depends on so many factors, it's impossible to 
know who, where and what it will affect most.  
Once again, the WHO failed to adequately respond to a pandemic, in a timely manner. 
They focused on building up capacity in nations, rather than adequately notifying the globe about 
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transmission and the severity of the virus. The most at risk were young child, pregnant women 
and those already ill, and there was little, if any, support for those who were most at risk, to make 
sure they had sufficient access to health centers. 
At first, it also seemed like the WHO was trying to keep the pandemic quiet. They spoke 
to only a small amount of emergency committee actors, and focused with different technical 
units, which failed to create a overarching plan (Fineberg, 2014). They severely failed in public 
involvement, and denied several conferences on the progress of H1N1. The WHO also failed to 
facilitate the distribution of a vaccine in time for the peak of the H1N1 pandemic, and when they 
did eventually distribute vaccines to seventy-seven countries, it took them way too long to make 
a coherent decision. This also falls on the responsibility of pharmaceutical companies to develop 
a vaccine, “manufacturers in their willingness to donate vaccine, concerns about liability, 
complex negotiations over legal agreements with both manufacturers and recipient countries, a 
lack of procedures to bypass national regulatory requirements for imported vaccine, and limited 
national and local capacities to transport, store, and administer vaccines” were huge obstacles in 
creating a coherent decision (Fineberg, 2014). It is basically up to pharmaceutical companies to 
decide when and if they want to produce a vaccine. This is a huge problem when a pandemic hits 
out of nowhere. 
The response to H1N1 was extremely incoherent and confusing. Both the IHR and 
WHO’s response has brought to light many issues within the global health emergency. Because 
of the many factors involved in how severe influenza can be, it is impossible to guess where and 
how bad the next outbreak could be. While, there has been a lot of progress made compared to 
the 1918 Spanish flu, there is still much to learn from the failures within the global emergency 
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response committee. There are still many obstacles on influenza preparedness because of a lack 
of scientific understanding, and because the outbreaks are dispersed, it’s difficult for one 
organization to take on the responsibility for an entire globe. There was no government 
responsibility in providing the public with trust, support and awareness. While the WHO and 
IHR, and the Global Health Security Agenda, are trying to build capacity, surveillance and 
laboratory improvements, these really won’t necessarily help. As stated before, it’s very difficult, 
if even possible, to detect the next outbreak of influenza. Because influenza spreads so easily and 
quickly, along with government and local health support, there really needs to be better scientific 
research and development in order to keep up with the pace of the virus, since, “the annual 
capacity of influenza-vaccine production covers less than one third of the global 
population”(Fineberg, 2014). 
Other issues that lied within the correct and successful response to H1N1 lied in the lack 
of transparency and conflict of interests. Many organizations including the WHO downplayed 
the seriousness of the pandemic, and thus responded with confusion and lazily. There is also too 
much power from private stakeholders, like pharmaceutical companies, to decide if it is worth 
making a vaccine. “ [The] WHO state[d] that worldwide more than 213 countries and overseas 
territories or communities...reported laboratory confirmed cases of pandemic influenza H1N1 
2009, including at least 16, 455 deaths”; so why did it take so long form them to create a vaccine 
(Flynn, 2010, p. 12)? Clearly not everyone who catches the flu dies, so since there are certain 
high-risk groups, like babies, pregnant women and previously ill persons, pharmaceutical 
companies may be skeptical to make a vaccine since it is not extremely profitable. But the 
opposite effect can also happen during flu pandemics. In the 2009 outbreaks, there were several 
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conflicts of interest. Once pharmaceutical companies started to make a vaccine, members of the 
WHO hyped up the importance of the vaccine in order to increase the sales and profits for 
pharmaceutical companies. It also become extremely risky once pharmaceutical companies 
contain this much power , to “directly influence public decisions taken with regard to the H1N1 
influenza, and the question of whether some of their statements had been adopted as public 
health recommendations without being based on sufficient scientific evidence” (Flynn, 2010). 
The handful of advisory members within the WHO that had professional ties to pharmaceutical 
groups, were given out large research grants to these members, which largely comprised the 
transparency of the WHO. To date, the WHO has yet to provide reasonable proof suggesting that 
this did not influence their decision to quickly call the H1N1 a level 6 pandemic. There is also 
evidence that suggests the WHO had reason to declare an influenza pandemic because of recent 
contractual agreements with pharmaceutical companies (Flynn, 2010). Studies suggest that 
“...the sales of H1N1 vaccines in 2009 were expected to result in overall profits of between 7 and 
10 billion dollars to pharmaceutical laboratories producing vaccines. According to figures 
presented by Sanofi-Aventis at the beginning of 2010, the group registered net profits of 7.8 
billion Euros (+11%) due to a “record year” of anti-flu vaccines sales” (Flynn, 2010). This 
largely comprises and undermines the trust in organizations like WHO, which as stated before 
proves to be an enormous obstacle in stopping newly emerging viruses.  
All of these conflicts create much confusion and undermine the trust that the globe holds 
within international health organizations. These interventions were handled with secrecy, lies, 
and so much confusion, that it’s impossible to even come up with a liable alternative for dealing 
with the next influenza outbreak. Although it didn’t seem like a big deal that the WHO did this, 
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“[t]his decline in confidence could be risky in the future. When the next pandemic arises many 
persons may not give full credibility to recommendations put forward by WHO and other bodies. 
They may refuse to be vaccinated and may put their own health and lives at risk” (Flynn, 2010). 
Next time, rather than putting all responsibility, and trust, on the WHO, there should be an equal 
inclusion of government, non-governmental and individual dialogue, both internationally and 
domestically. 
The 2009 Flu pandemic was handled in a similar systematic manner as the Global Health 
Security Agenda. While the flu responses didn't specifically treat the pandemic like a security 
issue, the interventions were based on building capacity. However, it is important to realize that 
this doesn't work to stop a flu pandemics. The flu is airborne, and even if the best public health 
system is aware of the cases, large amounts of people could contract it before a successful 
intervention. The slow response to develop a vaccine, and the conflicts of interest ultimately 
failed the transparency and responsibility of health organizations. Another important point is that 
even with capacity building projects, member nations were not successful at stopping the flu 
within their state. Pharmaceutical companies also have too much power in deciding whether or 
not to make medicine. Along with many other infectious diseases, these interventions forget 
about the importance of affordable and accessible health care for impoverished people. The 
Global Health Security treats infectious diseases in a similar manner. These interventions did not 
rely on building strong health systems and developing safe, affordable medications for 
developing nations. Also, without collaboration form governmental structures, it is hard for the 
WHO to reply to a pandemic across the globe by itself. This narrative is very similar to the Ebola 
and Zika stories.  
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Conclusion Part I: 
Examining the domestic and international responses to Ebola, Zika and Influenza makes 
it obvious that there is not one magic solution for dealing with emerging and reemerging 
infectious diseases. Government's, health ministries and non profit international health workers 
often forget that each infectious diseases need to be examined individually, and involve the 
already existing local health workers. This paper is meant to prove that interventions, like the 
ones used in Ebola, Zika and Influenza responses often do not work in providing long term 
protection against infectious diseases. Also, specifically that the Global Health Security Agenda 
likely not provide the outcome that the American government hopes for. Emerging infectious 
diseases are caused and fueled by political strain, poverty, gender inequality, lack of 
communication and trust, and corruption, which can not be stopped by using the American 
military, and high tech laboratories. While the American government believes that the best way 
to protect its country is to address gaps in health systems, this will not solve the long standing 
issue of what triggers diseases. The best thing America could do, to protect its own nation, would 
be to build strong health care systems globally, and support countries with social and political 
equality. The next few paragraphs will examine why the GHSA will not be successful and how 
they could help countries that are prone to emerging diseases, while also protecting America. 
There are many problems with the Global Health Security Agenda. One obvious point is 
that the GHSA is attempting to protect Americans, at the expense of developing nations. Their 
perspective on this entire program is rather controversial and demeaning. Although it might not 
seem like it, the whole point of this program is to block infectious diseases coming from 
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developing nations to enter the United States, without having to directly and continuously  help 
them. It's hard to believe that America thinks the Global Health Security Agenda will work, since 
there is so much evidence that proves it will just be repeating the same, previous mistakes. While 
the Global Health Security Agenda could work for small, short term interventions it will 
certainly not stop re-emerging and huge, global epidemics. As discussed previously, there are 
still so many political and social obstacles that the GHSA does not take into account. For 
example, if distrust between governments and its citizens gives rise to infectious diseases, and 
women are still unable to receive proper reproductive care and health education because of 
repressive governments and inequality, how will putting in high tech laboratories and having 
SWAT like teams surveilling local towns help? If anything, that would just increase fear and 
uncertainty between the organizations and the citizens. There is zero trust built between the 
GHSA and the people it is trying to help. The people who are most at risk barely trust their own 
government, so why do we expect them to trust another government? The GHSA also attempts to 
address the situation with one magic solution. An entire array of infectious diseases, such as 
Ebola, Zika and Influenza, can not be stopped from entering into the United States by just one 
organization addressing the entire spectrum of diseases. And this was shown in the first chapter, 
when massive projects like vaccinations and penicillin were used to eradicate multiple diseases. 
Each country and each infectious disease should be treated differently and should regard cultural 
differences, past historical changes (political and social) within the country and local 
communities in order to fully and properly address the disease. The GHSA also fails to involve 
local governments, which has previously proved to be extremely important in stopping infectious 
diseases. The big issue is that there is not one solution to stopping diseases, and it is more 
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difficult than just building huge hospitals and laboratories. It takes governments, local and 
national health systems, and the people to all collaborate and trust each other. It is disappointing 
to see so much money go into a project that will likely not work long term or provide the care 
and support that the most at risk need. The solution is not as surprising as one would think, and 
with a little time and realism, infectious disease could be stopped.  
Another issue with the Global Health Security Agenda is that it only concentrates on 
emergency, infectious diseases that have the potential to infect large masses of people. While this 
seems important, which it is to certain point, this program fails to address the preventable 
diseases that kill more people per year, and disproportionately affect impoverished communities. 
Diseases like, "diarrheal diseases are among the top 10 leading causes of infectious disease 
deaths worldwide, accounting for 1.5 million deaths annually. Children under age 5 account for 
more than half of those deaths. Diarrheal disease is the second-leading cause of death in that age 
group"(Roussel, 2018). In developing nations all over the world, enormous amounts of mothers 
and their children die from preventable diseases. Malaria, birth and prenatal complications, 
pneumonia, malnutrition, and tuberculosis are leading causes of death. In a time where medicines 
and healthcare are available, programs like the Global Health Security Agenda focus their 
attention on health conflicts that are potentially dangerous to American and western security 
rather than on funding programs that would eradicate preventable diseases entirely.  
Overall, the Global Health Security Agenda approach will not be successful at protecting 
Americans, or eliminating infectious diseases. 
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Conclusion Part II: 
So what could America do to help nations that suffer from infectious diseases? First of 
all, that is not exactly what the Global Health Security Agenda aims to do. Sadly the point of the 
program is not to help local people suffering from infectious disease. But rather, the point is to 
stop those diseases from affecting, or spreading into America. So sadly, these recommendations 
are futile for the Global Health Security Agenda, if the purpose is not helping affected 
communities in a humanitarian perspective. However, the solutions are important to understand 
and recognize. Regardless, and they are quite simple. So then if the American government, and 
other involved first world countries want to really stop infectious diseases from spreading across 
the world, what could be done?  
The first and arguably the most important recommendations, to stop infectious diseases, 
are to support and provide education, provide access to reproductive care, and alleviate women 
out of poverty. There is ample research that proves that educating women leads to a healthier life, 
and thus healthier children. One study shows that, "more educated women know more about 
prenatal care and child health, and hence might have lower fertility because of greater confidence 
that their children will survive. Female education has a greater impact on age of marriage and 
delayed fertility than male education"(Pradhan, 2015). Other studies show that, "[i]f all women 
had a primary education, there would be 15% fewer child deaths. If all women had a secondary 
education, child deaths would be cut in half, saving 3 million lives" (UNESCO, 2013). Providing 
reproductive and basic education, as well as equality and access to health services is critical in 
stopping infectious diseases. The Global Health Security Agenda does not address women's 
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equality or education at all, which is a huge issue. Adopting a more humanitarian outlook on 
solving infectious diseases could be extremely successful for the Global Health Security Agenda.  
The second recommendation is to stop supporting corrupt governments. There are often 
ample infectious diseases in corrupt nations for several reasons. Most times, the governments 
keep the money which is meant to provide health services to its citizens. Because of this, the 
people do not trust health workers, doctors are underpaid, and there is no incentive for nurses to 
show up to work in a time with Ebola ravaging throughout their hometown. Even with huge 
hospitals and high tech resources, with no trust between the government and its people, diseases 
like Ebola, Zika and Influenza will not stop. People will not show up to hospitals if they believed 
the government is corrupt and trying to kill them. Even when health workers come to the villages 
the locals will not trust them. Most international health workers, especially ones that work for 
programs similar to the GHSA, do not regard any cultural obstacles. For the Ebola epidemic, this 
was a huge issue. International organizations paid no attention to the individual cultures of 
villages affected by Ebola. Without the government gaining the trust of its people, it is extremely 
difficult to achieve a infectious disease free country. Again, the Global Health Security Agenda 
fails to recognize this as a realistic solution to stop infectious diseases.  
Another suggestion is to support and monitor local and domestic health initiatives, which  
is extremely helpful in combating infectious diseases. Local health initiatives that gain the trust 
of the people and create a safe and accessible place to seek health services are some of the most 
important solutions. Giving money to these local programs could be beneficial both domestically 
and internationally. It is necessary to monitor these programs, especially in countries with history 
of corruption and repressive governments, but, doing this would have been beneficial for Ebola, 
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Zika and Influenza. Accessible and safe care is a luxury that many people around the world have 
no access to. Sadly, the Global Health Security Agenda does not focus on domestic and local 
health initiatives. The program focuses on building hospitals, sending over SWAT teams, and 
creating high tech laboratories to stop infectious diseases. But this still doesn't give access to 
remote and high risk citizens. It's not that they need huge hospitals to treat these diseases, but 
they need a trusting local and domestic health system whom they will listen to if an epidemic 
comes to their village. While international organizations can help for short term, emergency care, 
it will not provide a long term stable health system across the globe.  
Another important solution is to distribute funding and attention towards high mortality 
health issues. While infectious disease prevention is important, high numbers, of specifically 
children and women, die from pregnancy complications and preventable infections, which with 
the correct funding, attention and a basic health care system could easily be eliminated. Billions 
of dollars are being used in the Global Health Security Agenda to combat future disease threats, 
but they likely won't be successful. Re-evaluating the process and implementation of preventing 
and treating diseases is extremely critical. Lastly, it is important to modify the intervention in 
every outbreak. Having the exact same intervention tactics to stop an outbreak is pointless. Every 
country, every town, and every person will respond different to an epidemic.  
All of these suggestions are important to stop infectious diseases domestically and 
internationally. Sadly the Global Health Security Agenda does not address any of these tactics. 
As shown previously, and examined within the Ebola, Zika and Influenza epidemics, the 
problems which fuel epidemics are often more political and social than one would think. It is 
easy to say that providing hospitals and men in white suits and yellow gloves to developing 
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nations will stop diseases, but that is extremely incorrect. Every country needs basic, accessible, 
safe and equal health treatment in a country that is provided in a transparent environment and is 
looking out for the best interest of its people. Sadly, as shown, this is not available to most of the 
world. America has the power to shine this light on the world and keep everyone safe from 
infectious diseases. It is extremely discouraging to see this amount of support and money being 
fueled into a project that will not be successful in the long term. The world needs to stop looking 
at disease as a poor person's problem, but rather a predisposing barrier that barricades people 
from living up to their full potential. Recognizing this is the first step to a long list of political 
and social behavior changes that need to be implemented. This paper makes it extremely clear 
that the Global Health Security Agenda will not stop diseases from spreading domestically, and 
into the United States. The future of emerging diseases is extremely uncertain and alarming. By 
looking in a different lens, it is apparent and obvious what steps need to be taken, however rich 
governments fail to recognize the true reasons, which are less expensive and difficult than 
building giant hospitals. In a paper such as this, it truly highlights the importance of reflection 
and critical thinking. If only governments and international organizations could see beyond their 
traditional path, and start progressing, a world without epidemics is possible.  
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Personal Remarks  
When I first began this project, I knew very little about to solve infectious diseases. But I 
knew I had one question in mind, and that was, "what is the most effective way in combating 
infectious diseases, especially in developing nations." In the grand scheme of things, I still know 
very little. But throughout this project I have gained the knowledge to further understand the 
reason for how, why and where epidemics spread.  
This paper just barely dives into the extremely complicated subject of international 
disease, but I feel like I now have the foundation to make a difference in the health world. It's sad 
to read and write about how impoverished people are often the worst off, but it's also important 
to understand, so something can be done about it.  
Health should be a priority for all governments, and safe and affordable care should be 
accessible to every person regardless of their gender, income and age. Even though infectious 
diseases are important to treat, most mortalities, in both developing and developed nations, come 
from noncommunicable diseases and complications in health emergencies. Education and 
training is very critical for both health workers and the public. Reproductive education for young 
girls, and adults, should also be provided to all people regardless of their governments politics 
and religious background. And arguably above all else, a strong health system, where all people 
have access to safe care should be implemented. 
This paper was a great way to end my time at Bard College and I am very grateful for all 
the help I received along the way. I hope that one day, every person will have access to safe and 
affordable health care. For now, I hope this paper teaches people about infectious diseases, and 
that instead of being afraid of them, governments and it's citizens should work together. 
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